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Abstract: Fixed Communication Provider (FCP) is a consortium of Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) which users can switch easily and freely between their ISPs. In order to increase the QoS
of the ISPs, we propose a two class service model as the following. ISPs divide their available
bandwidth into two parts to provide their end users with optimal services. One dedicated to pri-
mary users, and the other for secondary users. Primary users are those who pay more and thus,
expect dedicated bandwidth that is always available. Secondary services are provided by ISPs for
the other users who cannot afford the dedicated bandwidth. In this study, by defining the utility
functions for both user types, we aim at dividing the ISP bandwidth between these two services
such that the utility function of the users is maximized. Since the primary users do not always use
the maximum bandwidth, an algorithm is proposed for ISPs to estimate the primary users’ required
bandwidth in each time segment based on the previous segments. Based on this estimate, the ex-
pected bandwidth is dedicated to the primary users, and the remaining bandwidth is devoted to the
secondary users to improve the Quality of Service (QoS). On the other hand, an ISP is penalized
if it fails to provide the primary users with the required bandwidth mentioned in their contract.
Therefore, there exists a trade-off between the conservative estimation of the primary users’ rate,
QoS of the secondary users and the achieved utility of the ISPs.
keywords: Network analysis, Network management, Quality of service (QoS).
1. Introduction
Rapid development of technology and the need for online information has made the Internet an im-
portant necessity for our daily lives. Internet users form a wide range of individuals with different
needs. Some people use the Internet only for their businesses, while others may need it for their
personal and social communications. Therefore, different individuals have different expectations
from Internet services. For example, QoS is important to users of the first category as low QoS can
cause them financial losses. However, QoS may not be as important for users in the second group.
Although technological developments have enabled ISPs to provide different services for dif-
ferent types of users, this idea is not yet realized [1]. Currently, ISPs only offer services with
predefined user’s maximum rate or traffic [2]. Recently, some ISPs have suggested services based
on the packets prioritization [3], but this approach contradicts the network neutrality regulation.
It is mentioned in the network neutrality regulation that the government and ISPs must treat the
Internet data equally and must not differentiate between Internet data based on their user type,
content, website and application. Supplementary information in this regard can be found in [4, 5].
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Several approaches are proposed in the literature to provide more efficient Internet services
[6, 7]. A common approach is that the Internet services are divided into different classes. In
Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) method proposed by Odlyzko, different QoS’s are achieved by two to
four service classes with different pricings [8]. Shetty et. al. have proposed a two-class service
for the Internet based on the PMP model [2]. In this model, the ISP bandwidth is dedicated to
two services named primary and secondary services, based on maximizing three scenarios: The
utility of a class of users, the utility of only users and the total utility of the ISP and users. In [9],
an optimal pricing scheme was obtained for a monopolistic market and the authors analyzed the
economic impacts on the providers’ revenue, while in [10], the authors studied the dynamics of the
users’ demand in a monopolistic manner. In [11], they considered a simplified framework with only
one primary user to increase his performance while satisfying the secondary users’ requirements
under incomplete channel state information (CSI) in the cognitive radio. None of these papers,
considered cooperative strategy to manage the network resources between multiple primary and
secondary users. Moreover, we will show by considering the dynamics of users’ demand, that both
ISPs and users can be even more satisfied.
In this paper, we propose a two class service model in order to analayze the interaction between
ISPs and users who are in the same FCP. Considering multiple primary and secondary users, we
provide a novel analytic model between ISPs and users. The core idea is similar to the cooperative
spectrum sharing in cognitive radio literature (e.g. [12, 13, 14]) where secondary users collaborate
with primary users to use their bandwidth. ISP bandwidth is divided into two parts. In the first
part, the bandwidth is dedicated to the primary users who expect a dedicated bandwidth due to
their higher payment. In the second part, there are secondary users who expect the minimum QoS
declared in the contract between them and the ISP. We define the utility functions for both user
types, then divide the ISP bandwidth between these two services such that the utility function is
maximized. Since the primary users do not always use the total perchased bandwidth, a method is
proposed for ISPs to estimate the primary users’ required bandwidth in each time segment based
on the previous segments. We attempt to demonstrate the benefits of this strategy for both ISPs
and users.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, ISP services for the users are explained, and
analytic models for both primary and secondary users are presented. In section 3, the presented
model is analyzed and the results for both users are given. Finally in section 4, the paper is
concluded.
2. Proposed Game Theory Model
2.1. Problem Definition
In order to provide better and more economic services, ISPs divide their end-users into two groups,
primary users and secondary users. The primary users receive high quality services in return of
higher payment. In fact, these users buy a dedicated bandwidth and expect it to be always available
to them by the ISP. Another service type is given to secondary users who do not expect very high
QoS or cannot afford buying a dedicated bandwidth. Secondary users expect minimum QoS. The
available bandwidth for these users is variable in time. For instance, the available bandwidth ap-
proaches its minimum values during the daytime when there is more demand for Internet services,
while the bandwidth increases in the last hours of the day and midnight, due to the reduction in the
demand.
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Primary Service
Secondary Service
Fig. 1. A model for ISP services to the users.
Science and research centers, universities, government organizations, banks, large companies
and even home users who need dedicated bandwidths are some examples of primary users. Sec-
ondary users are typically home users for whom buying a constant bandwidth is not economical.
This classification is shown in Fig. 1.
As it is already mentioned, each ISP provides two types of services. With the first type of
service, user enjoys a trusted service in return for paying more money. With the second service
type, a user accepts the minimum quality offered by the ISP, in return for paying less money. In this
study, we as the regulatory organization, aim at distributing the bandwidth available to each ISP
between the primary and secondary users in a way that both sides are fairly satisfied, in addition to
determining the price of both service types.
2.2. Problem Modeling
Assume that there exist M (constant) competing ISPs, each of which providing both service types
to their customers. The super script m = 1, . . . ,M denotes the variable related to the m’th ISP.
Assume that there exists a total number ofN end users, withN being a large number. Each ISP has
purchased the bandwidth Cm > 0 for the cost of τ > 0 per bandwidth unit. The ISPs’ investment
on purchasing the bandwidth is irreversible and cannot be changed. The available bandwidth Cm
is divided into two parts Cmp and C
m
s , representing the bandwidths dedicated to the primary and
secondary services, respectively (Cm = Cmp + C
m
s ). Z
m denotes the number of users who have
received their required service from the m’th ISP, and equals the total number of the primary users
(Zmp ) and secondary users (Z
m
s ). In the following, we indicate the analytic model between the
secondary users and ISPs at first, and then consider the same problem for the primary users.
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2.2.1. Secondary Service: In order to present its secondary service, each ISP announces qms,min
and pms to the secondary users. The subscript s denotes the secondary users. q
m
s,min determines the
lowest QoS offered by the m’th ISP to the secondary users, and pms is the price of such service.
qms denotes the quality of the momentary service provided by the m’th ISP. It should be noticed
that after signing the contract between the ISP and secondary users, these users no longer are
charged for any momentary rise in quality higher than qms,min. Therefore, the secondary users have
the chance of accessing higher bandwidths when the demand is low, without paying any additional
costs, while they expect the QoS of qms,min according to the contract. Note that the minimum quality
of qms,min must always be guaranteed by the ISP.
When ISPs declared the QoS and prices, qms,min and p
m
s must find values in the market with their
minimum ratio equal to E, which is defined as below:
E = min
i
pis
qis,min
. (1)
Equation (1) is in correspondence with the reality of the price balance in the market. ISPs
balance their prices and QoS such that they all come to a consistent quality to price ratio in a
balanced situation. In fact, a user switches to a new ISP which offers lower price per bandwidth
unit. From a different viewpoint, if ISPs find out that there are other ISPs offering lower prices
for the same QoS, they will either decrease their prices or increase their QoS to avoid loss of their
customers and income. QoS perceived by the users connected to the m’th ISP is defined as:
qms = 1−
Zms
Cms
. (2)
This definition is consistent with our mentality about QoS [15], that is, QoS increases when ISP
promotes the bandwidth available to the secondary users while the number of users is constant, or
decreases when the number of users increases while the available bandwidth is constant. In the
QoS model, it is assumed that all users affect the QoS in the same way, that is, the traffic generated
by different users are equal. To simplify the problem modeling process, the bandwidth and the
number of users are normalized to values between zero and one, and are denoted by zms and c
m
s ,
respectively. zms =
Zms
N
is the ratio of the end users connected to the m’th ISP. cms =
Cms
N
denotes
the potential bandwidth available for each end user. Note that such normalization does not affect
the definition and equation of the QoS. Thus, (2) can be restated as:
qms = 1−
zms
cms
. (3)
Each i’th end user is known by a type θis which is a random variable at the range of [0, 1]. θ
i
s
shows the QoS priority for the secondary user. The greater the θis value, the more important the
QoS for a secondary user [16]. Now, the utility of the i’th user connected to the m’th ISP can be
calculated as below:
Um,is = θ
i
sq
m
s − pms , (4)
where θis is the user required network QoS in his maximum traffic. For instance, a user who uses
Internet for watching television channels has a larger θis compared to a user who needs the Internet
service only to check his email [2]. The user distribution function on θis is denoted by p(θ) at the
4
range of [0, 1]. Hence, the average utility of the secondary user who is connected to the m’th ISP
can be expressed as:
U
m
s =
∫ 1
0
Um,is p(θ)dθ. (5)
Normally in the literature, p(θ) is taken as the uniform distribution [17, 18].
2.2.2. Primary Service: ISPs announce the primary service price pmp per bandwidth unit to
primary users. In the balanced-price market situations, the final price is determined similar to the
secondary service case:
pp = min
m
pmp . (6)
In this way, the user must pay more for a higher bandwidth. In comparison with secondary
service, each user after connecting to the network, expects to constantly access the bandwidth
he has purchased from the ISP. In order to better manage the network resources, ISPs do not
always provide primary users with the total purchased bandwidth, because sometimes the user is
not connected to the network at all and it is not rational to dedicate to him a certain bandwidth in
such cases. In fact, the bandwidth bought by the user must be assigned based on the user’s demand.
For this purpose, ISPs break the time into timeslots. They decrease the assigned bandwidth to
the primary user if his used traffic has not been significant in a few latest timeslots. Otherwise, if
the traffic is increasing, the total bandwidth bought by the primary user is dedicated to him. At the
k’th timeslot, ISP dedicates the rate of g(rip, αk) to the user by adjusting a parameter named αk,
where rip denotes the bandwidth purchased by the i’th user from the ISP, and g(r
i
p, αk) is named the
limiter function due to its nature. If the ISP fails to dedicate the demanded rate of the user in each
timeslot, it must pay the penalty of λ per the rate unit, proportional to the amount of the decrease
in the bandwidth demanded by the user.
The bandwidth requested from the network by the i’th user at the k’th timeslot is represented
by ri,kp . Moreover, each primary user has a type θ
i
p that is defined in a way similar to the secondary
user. Now the utility function for the i’th primary user can be calculated as:
U ip = θ
i
pg(r
i
p, αk)− rippp + λI
(
ri,kp − g(rip, αk)
)
(7)
in which I(x) is defined as:
I(x) =
{
0 if x < 0
x if x >= 0 . (8)
In order to simplify the problem solving procedure, pi and ri,kp are assumed to be normalized by
Cmp . Then, we need to find the function g(x, αk) such that 0 < x, αk, g(x, αk) < 1, where αk is an
adjusting parameter used by ISP to change the bandwidth dedicated to the user at the k’th timeslot.
The ISP dedicates the total sold bandwidth when αk takes its maximum value, and provides the
user a minimum bandwidth when αk finds its minimum. Furthermore, the limiter function must be
designed to change with respect to αk in smaller αk values and it is greater than those in large αk
values. The reason is that the user’s traffic is usually burst and for the ISP to manage to follow the
momentary user’s rate, the limiter function must be more sensitive in smaller αk values and the rate
must change considerably in such situations. This can be concluded in the following equations:
g(x, αk) :

g(x, 1) = x
g(x, 0) = rmin
∂g(x,αk)
∂αk
∣∣∣
αk≈0
> ∂g(x,αk)
∂αk
∣∣∣
αk≈1
. (9)
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Fig. 2. g(x, αk) function.
in which rmin is the minimum bandwidth ISP provides for each primary users. Many functions can
be suggested to satisfy these three constraints. In order to have a tractable solution, the definition
of the gamma function is exploited. The proposed function is defined in the equation below:
g(x, αk) = (x− rmin)(αk)γ + rmin, (10)
where γ is the adjusting parameter of the limiter function at the range of [0, 1]. For a better realiza-
tion, for x = 0.9, rmin = 0.2, and different γ values, g(x, αk) is drawn in Fig. 2. αk is an adjusting
parameter determining the user’s traffic in the last timeslots, and can be adjusted as below:
αk =
k−1∑
k′=k−t
ωk′1
(
ri,k
′
p − g(rip, αk′)
)
t
, (11)
where the function 1(x) is defined as:
1(x) =
{
0 ifx < 0
1 ifx >= 0 , (12)
and the variable t denotes the number of timeslots involved in determining αk . ωk′ coefficients
must be chosen to minimize the difference between the g(x, αk) function and the real value at the
k’th timeslot. According to Fig. 2, the g(x, αk) function is more nonlinear for the smaller γ values
and can better trace the increasing burst traffics, although the tracing is not satisfactory in case of
the decrease in the burst traffics.
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3. Model Analysis
In this section, the problem model defined in section 2 would be analyzed. We begin with the
secondary service for this purpose, and then proceed with the analysis for the primary service.
3.1. Secondary Service Analysis
According to section 2.2.1, utility function of the i’th user connected to them’th ISP equals Um,is =
θisq
m
s − pms . Obviously, the user does not use the secondary service of the ISP if his utility is
negative. Thus, the secondary user must enjoy the positive U is, and their type must be in the form
of θis ≥ p
m
s
qms
. Note that qms denotes the momentary quality. To obtain a more conservative range for
θis, q
m
s is replaced with its minimum value, q
m
s,min. Then, we have:
θis ≥
pms
qms,min
= E. (13)
E is defined in (1). Therefore, the secondary users’ type falls within the range of [E, 1]. Referring
to the discussion in section 2.2.1, the type of the secondary users is assumed to be uniformly
distributed over the range of [0, 1]. Hence, the number of the secondary users connected to the
m’th ISP equals zms = 1 − E. The i’th user’s income is defined as Sis = θisqms . Similar to the
definition of the average utility in (5), the average income is defined and p(θ) is set to the uniform
distribution. Since the users’ type is in the range of [E, 1], we have:
S
m
s =
∫ 1
E
Sms p(θ)dθ
i
s =
∫ 1
E
θisq
m
s dθ
i
s = 1/2× qms (θis)2
∣∣∣1
E
= 1/2× qms (1− E2). (14)
Substituting (3) and zms = 1− E in (14) yields:
S
m
s = 1/2× (1−
zms
cms
)
(
1− (1− zms )2
)
=
1
2cms
× (cms − zms )
(
1− (1− zms )2
)
. (15)
Now, we aim at finding the number of the secondary users with their average income being maxi-
mized. Thus, we take the derivative of (15) with respect to zms :
∂S
m
s
∂zms
= 0 =⇒ −1 + (1− zms )2 + 2× (cms − zms )(1− zms ) = 0. (16)
In (16) 1− zms is replaced with E for the ease of calculations; Thus, we have:
− 1 + E2 + 2× cms E − 2× E(1− E) = 0 =⇒ 3E2 + 2(cms − 1)E − 1 = 0. (17)
Solving (17) yields the number of the secondary users with the maximum average income:
zms = 1−
1− cms +
√
(1− cms )2 + 3
3
. (18)
Note that since the other root of (17) is negative and thus unacceptable, it is not included in (18).
In the following, we want to calculate the ratio of the bandwidth available to the ISPs that is
dedicated to secondary users. The x ratio is defined as cmp = xc
m for x ∈ [0, 1], cmp = C
m
p
N
and
7
cm = C
m
N
. Regarding the fact that cm = cmp + c
m
s , we have c
m
s = (1 − x)cm. Using (17) the
bandwidth cms can be found as:
cms =
2E(1− E) + 1− E2
2E
= 1− 3
2
E +
1
2E
. (19)
Thus, we have:
x = 1 +
1
2cm
(
3E − 1
E
− 1
)
. (20)
Substituting E = p
m
s
qms,min
in (20) it can be restated as:
x = 1 +
1
2cm
(
3
pms
qms,min
− q
m
s,min
pms
− 1
)
. (21)
According to (20), x is an increasing function of E. It means that with the increase in the ratio of
the price to QoS, the regulatory organization forces ISPs to decrease the bandwidth dedicated to
secondary users, in order to deal with ISP overcharging. (20) is met as long as the parameter E
takes values such that x falls within its valid range. We set (20) to one to find an upper bound for
E, denoted as Eu, which yields Eu = 0.7676. In other words, the total ISP bandwidth is dedicated
to the primary users for E > Eu = 0.7676. Now, we find the lower bound for E, denoted as Eu.
For this purpose, we set x = 0 in (20) and solve it for E, which results in:
El =
1− 2cm +√(1− 2cm)2 + 12
6
. (22)
ISP dedicates its total bandwidth to the secondary users for E < El. The valid E is in the range
of El < E < Eu. In Fig. 3, the valid region is shown with respect to cm. The ISP can increase its
QoS with the increase in the perchased bandwidth per user, cm. By increasing cm, the valid region
for E expands. This fact is confirmed in Fig. 3. According to this figure, the lower bound of E
decreases with the increase in the normalized bandwidth.
3.2. Primary Service Analysis
Similar to secondary users, primary users employ this service only when their utility function is
always positive. Consecuently, setting U ip ≥ 0 in (7), we have:
θip ≥
rippp − λI
(
ri,kp − g(rip, αk)
)
g(rip, αk)
. (23)
We aim to find the lower bound for θip conservatively. To this end, the right hand side of (23)
needs to be maximized:
rippp − λI
(
ri,kp − g(rip, αk)
)
g(rip, αk)
≤ r
i
ppp
g(rip, αk)
≤ pp
g(rip, αk)
≤ pp
rmin
. (24)
Therefore, the utility function of users whose type falls within the range of [ pp
rmin
, 1] is always a
positive value and they use the primary services of the ISPs. Comparing the lower bound for the
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Fig. 3. Valid area for E (hachured) against the normalized bandwidth.
primary and secondary users, it can be deduced that the determining parameter in both of them is
the price and minimum QoS that ISP provides for the users of each specific service. By assuming
a uniform distribution for the type of the primary users, their average utility can be found as below:
U
i
p =
∫ 1
pp
rmin
U ipdθ
i
p =
1
2
(
1−( pp
rmin
)2
)
g(rip, αk)+
(
λI
(
ri,kp −g(rip, αk)
)
−rippp
)
(1− pp
rmin
). (25)
In (25), the parameters of the function g(rip, αk) in each timeslot are estimated to minimize the
difference between the momentary rate of the user, ri,kp , and the value dedicated to him at the k’th
timeslot. Therefore, we can say:
min
ω,γj
F (ω, γ)
∆
=
(
(x− rmin)
(∑k−1
k′=k−t ωk′1
(
ri,k
′
p − g(rip, αk′)
)
t
)γ
+ rmin − ri,kp
)2
. (26)
To minimize the objective function of (26), the parameters ω and λ update instantly with observing
each ri,kp sample by employing the steepest descent method. The formulas for updating these
parameters are given below:
ω+ = ω− − ρ∂F (ω, γj)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣− and (27)
γ+j = γ
−
j − ρ
∂F (ω, γj)
∂γj
∣∣∣∣−, (28)
where ‘−’and ‘+’signs denote the parameters in the previous and next steps.
9
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
·104
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Slot Number
No
rm
ali
zed
Ra
te
Fig. 4. A user’s traffic simulation with rip = 0.6.
Here, we analyze the capability of the proposed method in estimating the network burst traffic
for primary users. Burst traffic is usually modeled by the long tail distributions [19]. According to
the model proposed in [20] and regarding the fact that the momentary user’s traffic is normalized
to [0, 1], the beta distribution is used to model the burst traffic. In [21] and [22], it is mentioned
that there exists a long-range dependency (LRD) between the network traffic at different moments.
Therefore, we set the Hurst parameter of this traffic to 0.8 using an auto-regressive filter of the
order 10. The Hurst parameter shows the LRD of the network traffic and falls within the range of
[0.5, 1]. The closer this parameters to 0.5, the less the interdependency among moments of traffic.
Fig. 4 presents the simulated traffic of some user in 10000 different timeslots, with the pur-
chased bandwidth equal to rip = 0.6, and the parameters of the beta distribution equal to α = 3
and β = 4. Since the beta parameter takes values from [0, 1] range, it is multiplied by rip to find
values from [0, rip]. Fig. 5 shows the estimated and real rates in timeslots 3700 to 3800. The ISP
has managed to provide the user with his demanded bandwidth in all timeslots using this method,
without dedicating the total bandwidth bought by the user to him. Therefore, with appropriate
management, the ISP can dedicate the remaining bandwidth to secondary users to increase their
QoS. It can be observed in Fig. 5 that the estimated rate remains almost constant within timeslots
that the user’s rate does not vary greatly, due to the saturation of g(rip, αk) function.
3.3. Effect of the Parameter of the Beta Distribution
The beta distribution for some different parameters is given in Fig. 6. This distribution can model
various scenarios of the user’s application with different parameters. The user who maximally
uses his purchased bandwidth can be modeled by parameters α = 3 and β = 1, while the pa-
rameters α = 3 and β = 4 model a user who does not fully use his purchased bandwidth. Fig.
7 demonstrates the training of the γ parameter in estimating function g(·) against changes in the
beta distribution parameter. When α = 3 and β = 1, the user tends to exploites rates close to
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Fig. 5. Estimated traffic for the user in Fig. 4 in 100 timeslots.
the purchased bandwidth. Thus, the γ in the estimator must have a small value to properly work
for high rates. The fact in Fig. 2 that g(·) function becomes more saturated in the less λ values
confirms this issue. As observed in Fig. 7, the relative value of the γ parameter increases with the
increase in parameter β. This fact is consistent with the interpretation given for the γ parameter.
4. Conclusion
In this research, a novel analytic model is proposed for more efficient services management of the
ISPs which are in the same FCP. According to this model, the available bandwidth of the ISPs is
divided into two parts: one for primary users and the other for secondary ones. This division is
performed to maximize the benefit of the users. It is shown in section 3.1 that if the ratio between
the price proposed by the ISP and the minimum presented QoS is greater than 0.7676, the ISP must
refrain from supplying the secondary service in order to deal with ISP overcharging. On the other
hand, for the ISP to maintain its own benefits, this ratio should not fall below a specific threshold.
A reasonable range for this ratio is shown in Fig. 3. Since primary users do not always use the
total bandwidth sold to them, consistent assignment of the total purchased bandwidth causes the
resource loss. In order to better manage the available resources, ISP estimates the momentary rate
of the primary users in each timeslot, and determines the bandwidth delivered to them based on
this estimation. On the other hand, if ISP fails at providing the primary user with his required
bandwidth, it must pay him a penalty proportional to the amount of the missing bandwidth. With
this appropriate management, ISP can use the remaining bandwidth to increase the minimum QoS
of secondary users. The proposed method would be more successful in optimally devoting the
resources available to the network, compared with that proposed in [2], which is concentrated on
dividing the bandwidth between the two types of service. As the future work, we will consider
11
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more complicated and realistic utility function for the users to improve the proposed model. More-
over, it will be tried to propose a neural network approach to estimate the primary users rate in
order to increase the QoS of both type users.
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